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Felker: In Search of Morals in a Democracy

In Search Of Morals
In A DeIllocracy
by Donald W. Felker
Recently I heard a professor of sociology say, " Unless we have a belief in a created
universe we cannot talk about morals, we can only talk about customs." In the
discussion that followed it was made clear he meant that without some absolute, transcendental principles by which men might judge their actions we could not meaningfully deal with the whole area of oughtness or moral right and wrong.
One does not have to search very far to find someone who would argue the
opposite view: "My personal emotions and those feelings that I attribute to my neighbors are the criteria of what is good and true or beautiful for me at this time and this
place, and I need and wish for no other sanction." This is the position of the subjective relativists. Another type of relativist might disagree and sinlply equate what
is valued with what should be valued. His method of moral judgment could be a
statistically analyzed poll of values of a well-selected sample of individuals.
These two positions, tlle absolutist and the personal or cultural relativists, are
sometimes presented as the only alternatives open to us. It is sometimes mistakenly
thought that a rejection of absolutes opens the doors to an inevitable slide into cultural or personal relativism . On the oilier side the cultural and personal relativist refuses to grant any universal authority to moral principles for fear of backing into
ilie camp of the absolutist.
The search for morals that faces educational philosophers is a search for a
basis to deal with the question of " right " and " wrong " in a manner which will keep
us from a personal or cultural relativism and yet away from the position of moral
absolutes.
I shall argue that both of the positions mentioned are forms of moral irresponsibility and that there is a third alternative open to us. The third alternative is
a middle ground on which we can stand to arrive at a valid moral position. Professor Hullfish's iliought on the place of moral judgments in a democracy can give
us a great deal of inSight and we will refer to his ideas frequently.
It might be well to pause briefly to see the object of our search. Morals, as I
shall be using the term, refers to the process of establishing principles for evaluating
actions or proposed actions in ilie social interplay of human beings. It is the attempt of this paper to show that the position requiring referral to an absolute code
of rules and the positions of gross cultural and personal relativity toward right and
wrong are not positions of moral adequacy but are rather positions of moral irresponsibility. As a preferred alternative I shall propose the pOSition of moral judg-
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ments based on human experience which take into account the probable consequences
of our behavior.
When we deal with morals we are dealing with ought or choice situations.
These are situations where human beings are forced to make decisions that have
consequences for themselves and for others of the human race. The absolutist would
look to a set of rules or a code of conduct that would gUide him in what choice to
make.
These absolutes would serve two functions:
(1) They provide an unchanging and unchangeable rule for conduct. The rule
is beyond criticism and inquiry in the eyes of the absolutist. As it operates the absolute principles give a measure of stability to the human arena.
(2) They provide a universal rule which is applicable to human conduct without
regard to particular characteristics of any event, without modification by time, place
or immediate circumstances.
Due to these functions of absolutes this position has two characteristics which
make it basically a position of moral irresponsibility.
The first characteristic is that it takes the responsibility for a moral judgment
and the resulting moral action away from the individual and places the responsibility on some rule or code of conduct. If the rule can be applied unequivocally then
the person need only apply it. He need not decide if there are extenuating circumstances. He need not judge the possible results. He need only apply the rule and he
has fulfilled his responsibility. The judgment is fairly simple, Le., am I confronted
with that which is covered by the rule? If the answer is yes, then I apply it.
This position requires a minimum of reasonable inquiry and probing for the
knowledge upon which to judge. In fact, where there are effective absolutes operating
we have gone out of the field of judgment and are dealing only with application.
But it is blind, not reasoned application. It could be done by a machine. Experience
has taught us that many principles which we recognize as generally good can lead
to moral havoc when they are arbitrarily and blindly applied.
The second characteristic that makes the absolutist's position one of moral
irresponsibility is that it does not base its judgments on consequences. An absolute
rule is one that is "right" or " wrong" regardless of the consequences. Some might
contend that the application of the absolute rule is somewhat of a guarantee that
the consequences will be good. But this is assuming exactly what should be under
question .
Our past experiences help us to determine what might be the probable consequences of a particular type of action. Professor Hullfish has spoken forcefully
about the dangers in applying a rule without regard to the consequences. While
speaking about competition and co-operation he said, "Men may compete, or cooperate, in order to achieve ends which are destructive of human decency. Competition and co-operation have to be judged in the light of human consequences they
bring to pass. They have no value apart from situations in which they characterize
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action . In such situations the test they must meet is how they advance or retard a developing respect for individuality. Our failure to grasp this fact has led many in
education to line up in opposing camps, with one camp sentimentally damning competition in any form while praising all co-operative acts, and the other, no less sentimentally, damning all co-operative efforts while praising competition, however it is
expressed. Each camp is wrong. Either act is good when it results in increased respect of man for man; either is bad when it fails to do so. Teachers would be well
advised, therefore, to look upon the consequences of action, not to its external form,
before passing judgment upon it." (Toward a Democratic Education, The Ohio State
University, 1960, p. 10) Any other type of moral injunction or rule which is applied
without regard to the consequences in a particular situation could come under the
same rebuke.
The individual who goes to the other end of the continuum and adopts an
attitude of subjective or cultural relativism is equally in a position of moral irresponsibility. His position is avowedly not a " moral" position in the sense that there
is any universal basis for judging the rightness or wrongness of actions. The only
standard is his personal deSires, whims and feelings, or the customs of a cultural
group. In its extreme personal form this type of approach to morals sounds very
similar to the psychological description of the psychopath - a person who understands the norms of SOCiety, but ignores them. The person who acts on impulse even
though he has knowledge of " right and wrong " because he has no real concern
for anyone or society in general. (Johnson, D. M. , Psy chology, A Problem-SolVing
Approach, Harper and Brothers, 1961, p. 519.)
The main oversight of the absolutist is that he ignores consequences, the main
moral failing of the personal or cultural relativist is that he ignores human experience. In the last sentence of Democracy and Education, John Dewey said, " Interest
in learning from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest. " But this is
exactly what the personal and cultural relativist denies - that it is possible to learn
what is the right thing to do in a present situation from past experiences and contacts. He denies that it is possible to arrive at principles that will apply to all men
which will gUide us in a moral life.
Although the main fault of the relativist is that he does not look to past experience for formulating moral principles, he also ignores the force of consequences
in arriving at his moral deciSions. Situations may be varied in such a way as to
facilitate a different consequence of tlle same action. This we do not deny. But the
personal or cultural relativist has no basis on which to judge even the goodness and
badness of consequences and they are therefore removed from him as being significant for his decision.
Are these the only alternatives that we have? Are we forced to adopt absolute
principles to keep out of the moral anarchy of the relativist? Or if we shun the position of the cultural or personal relativist are we forced into the fold of the absolutist? I think not, and I would propose a third alternative. In order that we might
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have a label for the position which I will outline, I would suggest that we call it
" Experiential Relativism." It is a position of relativism in that it is not based on
absolute principles and yet it is a relativism that has a different base than those
that have been mentioned. The cultural relativist adopts bases of moral judgment
that are relative to the culture or the society in which the individual finds himself.
When in Rome do as the Romans do . The personal relativist adopts bases of judgment that are relative to the desires and whims of the individual. Experiential relativism finds its basis for moral judgment in the experience of the human race. It
is relative to all of human experience.
Experiential relativism is a position that attempts to arrive at moral responsibility rather than irresponsibility. It does not remove human decision from the realm
of choice based on experience and consequences. Because of this I would contend
that it is a position that is more " moral " than either the absolutist or the cultural
or personal relativist.
I would base my contention on three points. Experiential relativism adopts
moral imperatives without falling into the irresponsible pit of absolutes. It is also a
position that involves an intelligent view of consequences of an act as helping to
determine the " moralness " of the act. And lastly it is a position that places the responsibility of moral choice and decision on man.
Experiential relativism steers away from the type of relativism that would remove authority from moral judgments or moral prinCiples, but rather looks to certain
principles that have been shown in the experience of the human race to be good
for mankind. These principles function as moral imperatives. They are stable. They
are enduring and they are not easily changed by the desire and whim of the individual. They are in a real sense " universal " because they are good for men of any
culture and can be used to judge the moral actions of men in any part of the world .
In this sense they fulfill the one good function of absolutes. They give stability to
an otherwise fluid situation.
The fulfillment of this function is necessary to rational and serious human conduct. C. 1. Lewis said, " To act, to live, in human terms, is necessarily to be subject
to imperatives; to recognize norms. Because to be subject to an imperative means
simply the finding of a constraint of action in some concern for that which is not
immediate; is not a present enjoyment or a present suffering. To repudiate normative
Significance and imperatives in general, would be to dissolve away all seriousness
of action and intent, leaVing only an undirected floating down the stream of time;
and as a consequence to dissolve all Significance of thought and discourse into universal blah." (An Analysis 0/ Knowledge and Valuation, Open Court, 1946, p. 381.)
As we shall see later, these moral imperatives are not absolute in the sense that
there is no possibility of change or that they can be applied arbitrarily Without regard to the peculiarities of the situation.
Professor Hullfish called these enduring, stable, moral principles the " essential
principles of democracy. " He said, " They are: (1) respect for individuality, for the
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individual as a person; (2) respect for ideas, for the interplay of idea upon idea;
(3) respect for the co-operative effort in which compromise replaces force at points of
conflict; and finally, (4) respect for the sharing of common concerns as a means of
establishing the valuing of difference and diversity as avenues to the enrichment of
the lives of all. " (Toward . .. , p. 8.)
Principles such as these, which are shown to be good in human experience, are
to have the force of moral authority. The respect for individuality "ought" to extend
to all men. All should be respected simply because they have been born, not because
I like to respect them or not because society says that they should be respected.
This does not mean that because of particular actions, particular individuals
should not be" sidelined" for a period from the creative game of life. This is necessary if the game is going to progress for the rest of mankind and is necessary if
the individual is going to be fitted for entering into the intelligent and creative stream
of human endeavor. But even in those cases where there is a temporary setting aside
of some of the rights and privileges that go with respect for individuality, it is to be
done with the long-term consequences for the individuals of society in view.
In experiential relativism principles function as moral gUides in the determination of action, but they function even more as the basis for sentiment of coming
at life.
If we are going to avoid the pitfall of rules that are arbitrarily applied and
the moral blindness of such a position, then moral judgment is going to have to be
a way of approach to life. Rather than the applying of rules it is going to have to
be a sentiment by which we approach the decisions of life with an openness to learn
and to change. It is this sentiment or this manner of approach that gives meaning
to the directing principles that are shown in experience. It is also this sentiment that
keeps the whole process of moral judgment relative to human experience and not to
a tight, closed portion of that experience. It is this sentiment, gUided by the principles
that have been and are continually shown in human experience and conduct to be
good, that gives us the basis for moral judgment.
If this position is to include all of experience then it must also take into account
the consequences of an act. This is necessary if the act is to be one of moral responsibility. Although we have gUides and principles that function as moral imperatives
and may be said to be relatively enduring, the responsibility continues to rest with
men to apply these principles with caution and with an eye to the probable consequences of the action.
Here we can continue to learn from experience. Experience has shown certain
virtues and principles to be generally good, but it has also shown how they can be
misused. " Experience has shown each virtue to be good when sensitively used to
transform a situation; but it has equally shown each to lead to callousness when
arbitrarily imposed upon a situation. This is something young people should be
helped to discover. If they do not, they may either bull their way along, unthinkingly follOWing a book of rules, unaware of the moral havoc that blind action breeds;
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or, what is equally serious, they may decide that moral injunctions are but tinsel
adults hang on the tree of life to brighten it, not principles which are actually used
to direct conduct." (Toward . .. , p. 56.) This is the graphic way in which Professor
Hullfish pictured the need to speak with authority, yet to temper our applications
with sensitivity.
Even with principles that have been shown to generally advance the quality of
human experience we are not relieved of the necessity to apply them with the consequences in mind. This does not mean that the end justifies the means in the sense
that a morally good end is sufficient reason for using a means that would not be
judged morally good if it were judged by itself. This makes too sharp a distinction
between ends and means. But the need to look at consequences does show us that
means cannot be judged by themselves either. There is a close connection of moralness in the whole process of means-ends. Each is to be judged in relation to the
other and each is to be consistent with the principles of judging the "oughtness" of
a particular action.
Professor Hullfish gave us inSight into this relationship. He said, "The warrant
for the support of certain values over others in specific situations should always be
their greater promise to extend and improve relationships among men. In terms of
this warrant, we may properly demand that proposals for change in tradition and
custom demonstrate their validity before we take a new course or reconstruct an old
one. To say that custom is not to be arbitrarily followed does not release individuals
to do as they please. The moral act may no longer be one that is automatically correct. It is not just any act, however. The moral act springs from a rich imagination,
possesses the integrity that is the result of an intellectual effort to evaluate all relevant knowledge before behaVing, and is colored by the determination to be sensitive
to all human interests, callous to none. " (Toward . .. , pp. 57-58.)
In order to approach the moral act in such a manner, knowledge, motives,
attitudes and character must continually be under the scrutiny of an intelligent concern for the wider human consequences of any action. While we can learn from the
experience of men and what we learn can serve to check useless and haphazard
experimentation, this scrutiny can reveal stubborn facts which would lead us to reconsider the principles that we have adopted and the applications that we make of
them as we live. When we do this we will be entering into the moral, philosophic
enterprise. It is within experience that beliefs and values confront challenges and
one who holds a position such as experiential relativism is obligated to survey these
challenges in order that he might learn. It is these challenges which compel us to
check the stable principles against the knowledge of experience.
Lastly, experiential relativism is one of moral responsibility because it places
the responsibility of moral choice and deciSion on man. This perhaps is the most
pressing of the moral imperatives tllat experience has tended to reveal - that those
things which increase man's ability and responsibility to make intelligent and reasoned judgment are those things which are good for man. Experiential relativism
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offers no ready-made cookbook rules for making the moral decisions of life. On
the other hand it does not leave the individual without help, support and gUidance
in approaching the moral problems of living.
The school engages in the moral enterprise by offering this help, support and
gUidance. The role of the teacher in this moral enterprise is to stimulate his students
to think seriously about the meaning of the problems of life and the experience and
knowledge that is available to him in approaching these problems. He must strive
to help the student enter meaningfully into the areas of moral choice with a sentiment of responsibility and concern.
Even where this role of the teaching process is fulfilled, the moral responsibility or the decision that is made rests with the individual. The individual makes
the choice - it is not a rule that is to blame, it is not circumstances that bear the
moral responsibility, but it is the intelligent or not so intelligent choice of the individual that contributes to the consequences of the action.
The work of the educational philosopher is to help the individuals who come
under his range of influence to strive for intelligent choice in the decisions of life.
John Dewey said, " It is the bUSiness of a philosophy of education to make clear
what is involved in the action which is carried on in the educational field, to transform a preference which is blind, based on custom rather than thought, into an intelligent choice - one made, that is with consciousness of what is aimed at, at the
reasons why it is preferred, and the fitness of the means used. Nevertheless intelligent
choice is still choice. It involves preference for one kind of end rather than another
which might have been worked for. It involves a conviction that such and such an
end is valuable, worthwhile, rather than another:' (w. H. Kilpatrick (ed.), The Educational Frontier, The Century Co., 1933, p. 288.)
It is this intelligent chOice, coupled with the sentiment of values that are beneficial to man, and the scrutiny of probable consequences that leads us closer to the
finding of morals in a democracy.
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